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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment grants everyone the fundamental right to a
speedy trial. 1 It is our constitutional right to be charged and tried in an
efficient and expeditious manner. 2 This right is also protected by a
federal statute, the Speedy Trial Act. 3 While it would seem that this
right is well-protected by both constitutional and federal law, in
practice, it may not be. Many claims for a violation of one’s right to a
speedy trial have been ignored; for example, in one Seventh Circuit
case, the trial did not commence for over 430 days from the date of the
charge. 4 One reason that the Seventh Circuit affirms these lengthy
delays is because it has been liberal with its application of the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Editor-in-Chief,
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972)
(stating that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162 (2006).
4
See United States v. Cunningham, 393 F. App’x 403, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2010)
(where 430 days passed between the indictment and trial but the Act was not
violated because the court invoked the ends-of-justice exception).
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excludable days exception provided in the Speedy Trial Act, 5 as well
as with what is considered a reasonable amount of time to bring the
defendant to trial. 6 Another reason is the lack of an efficient analytical
standard for courts to use to determine if a violation of one’s right to a
speedy trial occurred. The Seventh Circuit also chooses to affirm
dismissal without prejudice a majority of the time, which allows the
defendant to be reprosecuted, even though the Speedy Trial Act has
been violated. 7 As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s approach,
defendants are tried well after what is required by the Speedy Trial
Act, and those at fault for the delay are not punished.
This Note will examine the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act, in light of the precedent
passed down from the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit’s
application of the right to a speedy trial will also be compared to the
approach of the other circuit courts. This analysis helps to establish a
theory that the right to a speedy trial may be more myth than reality in
actual practice within the Seventh Circuit. While a bright-line rule of
when a person’s right to a speedy trial has been violated may not be
feasible, a more workable standard must be developed. The Seventh
Circuit must find a way to balance one’s individual rights with the
public interest. In addition, the Seventh Circuit must provide a
meaningful remedy when a violation occurs, as well as deter violations
through sanctions. This Note attempts to provide a balancing structure
for these rights, as well as to recommend a better approach to provide
a meaningful remedy for the violation of the right to a speedy trial.

5

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H) (excluding some days from the seventyday requirement).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879
F.2d 1501, 1507-08 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511
(7th Cir. 1988).
7
See Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32.
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I. BACKGROUND
A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is protected by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by federal statute.8
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly analyzed the right under both
contexts to determine if a violation of one’s right to a speedy trial
occurred and to decide whether to dismiss with or without prejudice. 9
A. A Constitutional Right: The Sixth Amendment
While public policy should, and does, shape our laws and the way
they are applied, our Founding Fathers established certain
constitutional rights that were considered fundamental and were to be
left untouched and unlimited. 10 One of these constitutional rights is the
right to a speedy trial and is found in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 11 The Sixth Amendment was put in place
“(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration[,] (2) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility
that defense will be impaired.” 12 In light of these factors, one can infer
that the Founding Fathers thought that the right to a speedy trial was
necessary and fundamental to preserve our rights and liberty as
individuals.
The federal government has further expressed and defined this
right through a statute, the Speedy Trial Act. 13 However, the Speedy
Trial Act does not, and indeed cannot, limit the Sixth Amendment’s

8

People v. Phipps, 933 N.E.2d 1186, 1192–93 (Ill. 2010); see U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
9
See Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32; Killingsworth, 507
F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509.
10
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972)
(stating that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . .”).
12
Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32.
13
Phipps, 933 N.E.2d at 1192–93.
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guarantee of a speedy trial. 14 As a result, courts must remember that
the right they are ensuring is one guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
B. A Statutory Right: The Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act assures that the defendant receives a speedy
trial by setting out time limits in which the trial must occur. 15 Under
the Act, any information or indictment “shall be filed within thirty
days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served
with a summons.” 16 In addition, the trial of a defendant shall occur
within seventy days from the date of the indictment. 17
However, there are some periods of time that are considered
excluded. 18
The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an
indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within
which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to
(A) delay resulting from any proceeding . . . to determine
the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;
(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other
charges against the defendant;
(C) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;
14

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
16
Id. § 3161(b).
17
Id. § 3161(c)(1).
18
Id. § 3161(h).
15
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(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on,
or other prompt disposition of, such motion;
(E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the
transfer of a case or the removal of any defendant from
another district . . .;
(F) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant
. . .;
(G) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a
proposed plea agreement . . .; and
(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to
exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning
the defendant is actually under advisement by the court. 19
In addition, a period of delay to allow the defendant to demonstrate his
good conduct and a “period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness” are excluded. 20
Futhermore, delay because a continuance is granted by a judge on his
own motion or at the request of the defendant or government is also
excluded. 21
If the time limit governing when an indictment or information can
be filed is violated, the charge “shall be dismissed or otherwise
dropped.” 22 If the time limit required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) is
violated, the indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the
defendant. 23 When the court is determining whether to dismiss with or
without prejudice, it shall consider “the seriousness of the offense[,]
19

Id. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H).
Id. §§ 3161(h)(2), (3)(A).
21
Id. § 3161(7)(A).
22
Id. § 3162(a)(1).
23
Id. § 3162(a)(2).
20
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the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal[,]
and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act]
and on the administration of justice.” 24 These factors seem to almost
always favor dismissal without prejudice in the Seventh Circuit.
In United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court reviewed the
Speedy Trial Act’s legislative history and determined that prejudice to
the defendant is a substantial factor in determining whether to dismiss
with or without prejudice as well. 25 The Supreme Court also
determined that the legislative history shows that Congress did not
intend for a certain type of dismissal to be the presumptive remedy for
a Speedy Trial Act violation. 26 Instead, courts have significant
discretion when deciding if a violation occurred and whether to
dismiss with or without prejudice. 27
The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo has provided insight into
the policy reasons behind the Sixth Amendment Right to a speedy
trial. 28 These same policy reasons, as well as the Sixth Amendment,
helped to shape the Speedy Trial Act. One important policy concern is
that the accused be treated with “decent and fair procedures”;
however, there is also a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. 29
When courts are unable to provide a speedy trial, the defendant may
gain an advantage. 30 For example, defendants may be able to negotiate
more effectively or manipulate the system, and those who are out on
bond have the opportunity to commit additional crimes. 31 In addition,
lengthy delays could have detrimental effects on defendants’
rehabilitation because they are often confined for long periods of
time. 32 Defendants could also use delay as a tactic by waiting until
24

Id.
487 U.S. 326, 333 (1988).
26
Id. at 334.
27
United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1988).
28
407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 520 (this also contributes to prison overcrowding).
25
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witnesses are unavailable or their memories fade. 33 As a result, in
addition to protecting the defendant’s rights, the Speedy Trial Act
serves an important societal function.
C. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Sixth Amendment and the
Speedy Trial Act
In United States v. Taylor, the Supreme Court stated that:
[A] district court must carefully consider those factors as
applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision,
clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful
appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain
whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that
Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy,
thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by
Congress. 34
The Supreme Court in Taylor also stated that “the district court’s
judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not be
lightly disturbed.” 35 If the district court does not articulate the reasons
for its decision, the appellate courts and Supreme Court are put in a
difficult position. Do they act with deference or do they analyze the
facts and circumstances of the case to decide how they would hold?
The following cases demonstrate the approach that the Supreme Court
has taken with regard to the right to a speedy trial.
1. Vermont v. Brillon
In Vermont v. Brillon, the defendant was arrested for felony
domestic assault and habitual offender charges and was tried three

33

Id. at 521.
487 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1988).
35
Id.
34

120
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

years later. 36 The defendant was convicted of second-degree
aggravated domestic assault in the district court. 37 The Vermont
Supreme Court vacated, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 38 The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded. 39
During his trial, Brillon was appointed at least six different
attorneys. 40 The United States Supreme Court noted that assigned
counsel acts on behalf of their clients, just as retained counsel does,
and that delays sought by counsel are usually attributable to their
clients. 41 The Court stated that the Vermont Supreme Court erred
when it attributed to the State the failure of assigned counsel to move
the defendant’s case forward. 42 The Vermont Supreme Court also
failed to properly take into account the role of Brillon’s disruptive
behavior. 43 The Supreme Court held that delays caused by defense
counsel, including appointed counsel, were attributable to the
defendant and that Brillon was not denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. 44
2. Barker v. Wingo
In Barker v. Wingo, the defendant, a state prisoner, challenged his
conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. 45 The district court denied

36

129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).
Id.
38
Id. at 1283.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1287.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1291.
43
Id. at 1292 (“His strident, aggressive behavior with regard to [his third
counsel], whom he threatened, further impeded prompt trial and likely made it more
difficult for the Defender General’s office to find replacement counsel.”).
44
Id. at 1293.
45
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
37

121
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/5

8

Winings: What Does Speed Have to Do with It?: An Analysis of the Seventh C

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

the petition, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 46 The Supreme Court also
affirmed. 47
The Supreme Court laid out four factors to determine if a
defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial: “Length of [the] delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” 48 Unless the
delay is “presumptively prejudicial,” there is no need to analyze the
other factors. 49 The Supreme Court then stated that these factors must
be “considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant.” 50
The Supreme Court determined that a delay between arrest and
trial of well over five years was extraordinary, but that two other
factors outweighed this deficiency. 51 First, the defendant suffered
minimal prejudice. 52 Second, the Court inferred that the defendant did
not want a speedy trial because he did not assert his right for four
years. 53 The Court noted that while the Commonwealth of Kentucky
was granted sixteen continuances, Barker did not object until the
twelfth. 54 The Commonwealth was then granted additional
continuances to which Barker did not object. 55
In addition, the Court noted that delay could often be used as a
defense tactic and that a violation of one’s right to a speedy trial does
not per se prejudice the defendant. 56 The Court rejected outright “the
rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id. at 530.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 533 (leaving the factors open-ended).
51
Id. at 533–34.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 516–17.
55
Id. at 517.
56
Id.
47
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his right.” 57 The Court stated that the better rule is one where the
defendant’s assertion or failure to assert his right is a factor to be
considered. 58 This places “the primary burden on the courts and the
prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.” 59 The Court
stated that unless there were extraordinary circumstances, it would be
disinclined to rule that a defendant was denied his rights if the
defendant failed to object to continuances and did not want a speedy
trial. 60 As a result, the Supreme Court held that Barker was not
deprived of his right to a speedy trial. 61
3. United States v. Taylor
In United States v. Taylor, the defendant was indicted for
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. 62 The district
court dismissed the indictment with prejudice, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 63 The Supreme Court reversed. 64
The Supreme Court stated that “review must serve to ensure that
the purposes of the [Speedy Trial] Act and the legislative compromise
it reflects are given effect.” 65 The Court noted that the trial was
delayed for numerous reasons, including the defendant’s obligation to
testify in another trial and slow processing by the trial court and the
Government. 66 The Court also analyzed the factors laid out in Barker
and noted that the defendant’s alleged crime was serious, the
Government’s conduct was lackadaisical, and the defendant failed to

57

Id. at 528.
Id.
59
Id. at 529.
60
Id. at 536.
61
Id.
62
487 U.S. 326, 329 (1988).
63
Id. at 326.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 336.
66
Id. at 328.
58
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appear for trial. 67 The Supreme Court also stated that the district court
did not provide explanations for its findings with regard to these
factors, and it did not consider each of the necessary factors. 68 The
Supreme Court pointed out that the district court did not make a
finding of prejudice and that while that is not dispositive, it is a factor
that favors reprosecution. 69
The Court criticized the district court’s reasoning by stating that
the deterrent effect of barring reprosecution 70 should not alone support
a decision to dismiss with prejudice because it would make all the
other factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) superfluous. 71 The Supreme
Court stated that the district court abused its discretion because it did
not weigh the factors correctly, it failed to explain why the
Government was lackadaisical, it failed to consider that the defendant
did not suffer prejudice, and it failed to take into account the
defendant’s contribution to the delays. 72 As a result, the Supreme
Court reversed and held that no violation of the Speedy Trial Act
occurred. 73
D. Other Circuits’ Application of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy
Trial Act
Just as it is important for the Supreme Court to act with deference
to the district courts, it is important for the federal courts of appeals to
do so as well. It is also necessary for the district courts to fully explain
their reasoning so that the courts of appeals can provide meaningful

67

Id. at 338–40.
Id.
69
Id. at 341.
70
Id. at 342 (where the district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice was
heavily influenced by the court’s concern that not to do so would condone the
Government’s behavior).
71
Id. at 342.
72
Id. at 343.
73
Id.
68
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review. 74 The following cases illustrate the other circuit courts’
application of both the Sixth Amendment right 75 and the statutory
right 76 to a speedy trial.
1. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Stradford, Stradford and two co-defendants
were charged with defrauding multiple lending agencies and engaging
in other financial fraud.77 The district court denied Stradford’s motion
to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds, and the Third
Circuit affirmed. 78
The magistrate judge granted a continuance so that the parties
could conduct plea discussions. 79 The government required Stradford
to consent to excluding that time for the purpose of the Speedy Trial
Act if they were to discuss a plea bargain. 80 Before the discussions
began, Stradford filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violations
of the Speedy Trial Act. 81 The district court denied Stradford’s
motion. 82 The Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation
of the Speedy Trial Act de novo, the factual findings for clear error,
and the decision granting a continuance for an abuse of discretion. 83
The Third Circuit noted that one of the enumerated exceptions for
the Speedy Trial Act that allows for time to be excluded is “‘[a]ny
period of delay resulting from a continuance . . . if the judge granted
such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
74

Id. at 336–37.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76
See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
77
No. 08-3256, 2010 WL 3622995, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2010).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at *2.
75
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and the defendant in a speedy trial.’” 84 Stradford argued that the
continuance order was invalid because it contained inaccurate
statements; however, the court stated that the reference to the wrong
name was just careless error and the fact that the negotiations were not
clearly in progress as the order stated did not matter. 85 The
continuance order was not invalidated because the district court had
set forth its reasons for granting the ends-of-justice continuance as was
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 86 As a result, the Third Circuit
held that a Speedy Trial Act violation did not occur. 87
2. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, the defendant was
convicted in the district court for possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute. 88 Defendant “moved to dismiss the indictment on
grounds that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act had been
violated.” 89 The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
because the Speedy Trial Act was not violated. 90 The time it took to
dispose of the oral motion for detention was considered excludable
under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Act. 91 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s conviction. 92
The Government made an oral motion for detention with the
district court. 93 The Fifth Circuit stated that “the day on which a
pretrial motion is made and the day on which the hearing is held are
both excluded for purposes of computing excludable delay under 18
84

Id. (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (2006)).
Id. at *3.
86
Id. at *3–4.
87
Id. at *4.
88
621 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2010).
89
Id. at 359.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 358.
93
Id.
85
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U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).” 94 The court noted that the Guidelines to the
Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 recognize the starting
date as the date that the motion is filed or made orally. 95 “[T]he
purpose of § 3161(h)(1)(D) is to ‘exclude all time that is consumed in
placing the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion[.]’” 96 The
court saw no reason why an excludable delay would not be triggered
by an oral motion in light of the purpose of the section. 97 Therefore,
the time that the district court took to decide the pretrial motion was
excludable. 98 As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that the Speedy Trial Act had not been violated. 99
3. The Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Orozco-Osbaldo, the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine. 100 The
defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 101 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal because the time spent by the district court considering
joinder of defendants was prompt disposition of a pretrial motion. 102
The Eighth Circuit stated that the district court was correct to
exclude the time during which it considered a motion for joinder
because it was excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Act. 103 The
court considered it to be a “delay resulting from any pretrial motion,
from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on,

94

Id. at 368.
Id.
96
Id. at 368–69.
97
Id. at 369.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
615 F.3d 955, 956–57 (8th Cir. 2010).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 957–58.
95
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or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 104 As a result, the time
was excludable, and there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 105
4. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Boyd, the defendant was convicted of
“possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute . . . [,]
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense . . . [,]
and being a felon in possession of a firearm.” 106 The defendant
appealed the decision of the district court, claiming a violation of the
Speedy Trial Act. 107 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court. 108
The defendant claimed that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act
were violated because the government colluded with state authorities
to delay his prosecution in an effort to buy time until a federal
indictment could be obtained. 109 In affirming the district court, the
Ninth Circuit stated that any delays by the state in prosecuting were in
good faith. 110 In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that while it
disapproved of the same prosecutor bringing both state and federal
claims for the same conduct (as had occurred in this case), “the district
court did not clearly err in finding that no collusion occurred here.” 111
As a result, the Ninth Circuit agreed that no violation of the Speedy
Trial Act occurred. 112

104

Id.
Id.
106
392 F. App’x 595, 596 (9th Cir. 2010).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 597.
109
Id.
110
Id. (meaning that the prosecution did not intentionally delay the trial
because any delay was done for the benefit of the trial).
111
Id.
112
Id.
105
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E. The Seventh Circuit’s Application of the Sixth Amendment and the
Speedy Trial Act
The Seventh Circuit has decided multiple cases that required an
analysis of the Speedy Trial Act. 113 Many of the cases required review
to determine if the district court correctly decided to dismiss with or
without prejudice. 114 The Supreme Court in Taylor stated that the
district court should “clearly articulate” the reasons for its decision
because a district court’s judgment “should not be lightly
disturbed.” 115 As a result, the Seventh Circuit has the challenging task
of balancing the necessary factors to determine if the district court
abused its discretion, as well as determining if a violation of the
Speedy Trial Act warrants dismissal with or without prejudice.
In the cases discussed below, the Seventh Circuit determined that
only dismissal without prejudice should be granted despite the fact that
there were lengthy delays and laziness on the part of the
prosecution. 116 However, if lengthy delays and laziness on the part of
the prosecution does not warrant dismissal with prejudice, what does?
The following section of this Note begins with an analysis of the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation, in five different cases, of the Supreme
Court’s analysis. It will then discuss the similarities and differences
among the Seventh Circuit, the other circuits, and the Supreme Court
in their application of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act.

113

See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1088 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879
F.2d 1501, 1507 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th
Cir. 1988).
114
Id.
115
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335–37 (1988).
116
See, e.g., Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32;
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at
509.
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1. United States v. Killingsworth
In United States v. Killingsworth, the defendant was charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, as well as possession of
a firearm used in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. 117 The
district court dismissed the indictment with prejudice for violation of
the Speedy Trial Act. 118 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded. 119
Killingsworth was indicted on two counts and pled not guilty. 120
However, arraignment on the indictment was never scheduled, and
Killingsworth did not receive a trial within the time required by the
Speedy Trial Act. 121 Just three days after the Speedy Trial Act deadline
had passed, Killingsworth filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
with prejudice. 122 During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
government put forth two arguments. 123 The first was that the
government had never been required to request an arraignment in a
criminal case where an individual had already been indicted. 124 The
second was that the government had contacted the magistrate judge’s
chambers at least twice to inquire about the arraignment but had not
received a reply. 125 The district court stated that the offense was a
serious one, but that it was impossible to determine if the court or
government was at fault for the violation. 126 The district court

117

507 F.3d at 1087.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1089.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
118
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ultimately decided to dismiss with prejudice because Killingsworth
himself was not responsible for the delay. 127
In reviewing the decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that the
district court undervalued how serious the crime was. 128 It also stated
that the district court “overemphasized Killingsworth’s conduct and
gave insufficient weight to the fact that the court itself may have been
at fault for failing to move the case along.” 129 The court noted the fact
that the delay was not intentional on the part of the government and
that Killingsworth himself stated that he suffered no prejudice. 130 The
court determined that these two factors—absence of bad faith by the
government and lack of prejudice to the defendant—leaned in favor of
dismissal without prejudice. 131 The Seventh Circuit stated that “the
purpose of the Act would not be served by requiring the court to
impose the maximum sanction for a minimum violation” because it
was a serious offense, the delay was minor, and there was no bad faith
shown. 132
The district court had also examined the fact that Killingsworth
was cooperating and just sitting in jail during this period. 133 The
Seventh Circuit stated that whether a defendant was detained pending
trial was not an explicit factor to consider under the Speedy Trial Act
and was not its primary focus. 134 As a result, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
the indictment with prejudice. 135 The Seventh Circuit then reversed
the decision of the district court and dismissed the indictment without
prejudice, stating that “insufficient weight was given to the seriousness

127

Id. at 1090.
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1091.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1087.
128
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of the offense, the lack of bad faith on the part of the government, and
the absence of prejudice to Killingsworth.” 136
2. United States v. Arango
In United States v. Arango, the defendant was charged with a
narcotics offense. 137 The district court denied Arango’s motion to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice. 138 The Seventh Circuit found
no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. 139
The district court dismissed the indictment against Arango “based
upon a seventy-two to ninety-three day . . . violation of the Speedy
Trial Act.” 140 In determining whether to dismiss without prejudice, the
district court analyzed the same three factors that were used in
Killingsworth. 141 On appeal, Arango argued that the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing without prejudice because of the
“substantial and prejudicial length of the delay.” 142
In its review, the Seventh Circuit examined the district court’s
analysis of the three factors. 143 It noted that possession of large
amounts of cocaine is a serious offense. 144 In addition, the court stated
that a three-month delay was not “per se ‘substantial’ enough to justify
dismissing the charges with prejudice.” 145 Arango also failed to show
any actual prejudice or how the delay impaired his rights. 146 The
Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the delay was the result of the
136

Id.
879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1989).
138
Id. at 1502.
139
Id. at 1509.
140
Id. at 1507.
141
Id. at 1507–08 ((1) whether it was a serious offense, (2) whether the delay
was minor, and (3) whether there was bad faith).
142
Id. at 1508.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
137
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court’s misunderstanding of the status of motions, some of which were
filed by the defendant. 147 The Seventh Circuit stated that because the
delay was through no fault of the government, “dismissing the
indictment with prejudice would not serve any purpose of encouraging
the government to avoid the neglect or bad faith in the prosecution of
its cases.” 148 As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice. 149
3. United States v. Fountain
In United States v. Fountain, the defendant was charged with firstdegree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 150 The district court
dismissed the murder indictment without prejudice. 151 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. 152
Fountain’s trial was put on hold in an effort to get a witness to the
murder to testify at his trial. 153 The court re-arraigned Fountain, and
eight days later, he invoked his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. 154
The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice, and a
grand jury re-indicted Fountain the same day. 155 Fountain argued that
the Speedy Trial Act only postponed his trial. 156 The Seventh Circuit
partially agreed with him and stated that more time elapsed than if he
would have “accepted the violation of the Speedy Trial Act
stoically.” 157 Instead, since Fountain’s motion to dismiss took the case
off the trial calendar and caused a subsequent dismissal and
147

Id.
Id.
149
Id. at 1509.
150
840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 523.
153
Id. at 511.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
148
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reindictment, the trial occurred 209 days after the mandate was
issued. 158
The Seventh Circuit conceded that a violation of the Speedy Trial
Act occurred and stated that district courts have broad discretion in
deciding to dismiss with or without prejudice. 159 The Seventh Circuit
distinguished its approach from that of the other circuits. 160 The
Seventh Circuit noted that its precedent required consideration of all
the “statutory desiderata” in deciding when to dismiss with or without
prejudice, while other circuits, such as the Ninth, have held that a
“‘lackadaisical’ attitude by prosecutors requires dismissal with
prejudice.” 161 In this case, the Seventh Circuit admitted that the
prosecution was careless, but stated that other statutory factors had to
be considered as well. 162
The Seventh Circuit “observed that first-degree murder is a grave
offense,” and that it is important to “deter murder and punish
murderers” because “murder was a more serious offense than the
violation of the Speedy Trial Act.” 163 The court also noted that a
“defendant who waits passively while the time runs has less claim to
dismissal with prejudice than does a defendant who demands, but does
not receive, prompt attention.” 164 In addition, the court observed that
the delay in this case did not lead to the detriment of Fountain. 165 In
light of all of these factors, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
indictment without prejudice. 166

158

Id.
Id. at 512 (“[R]eview on appeal is deferential.”).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 513.
165
Id.
166
Id.
159
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However, after stating its holding, the Seventh Circuit went on to
express its distaste at how the case proceeded. 167 The court focused on
the fact that Fountain did not have counsel for a significant period of
time and that counsel may have prevented some of the problems that
Fountain encountered. 168 In addition, the court acknowledged that
there was no excuse for the prosecution’s neglect of the case. 169 The
Seventh Circuit also stated that if the same problem were to recur, it
would “not be so easy to chalk it up to inadvertence.” 170
4. United States v. Hills
In United States v. Hills, Tylman, Hills, and Winters were indicted
with “conspiracy to impede the IRS” and for filing false income tax
returns. 171 They were tried in a joint trial in the district court. 172 The
district court found Tylman and Hills guilty of conspiracy, and Hills
and Winters guilty of filing false tax returns. 173 The defendants
claimed that the district court made various errors, that their statutory
and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated, and that a
search had violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 174 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed Tylman’s and Winters’s convictions, vacated Hills’s
convictions, and remanded. 175
The Seventh Circuit first addressed the defendants’ claim that
their statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. 176 The
defendants argued that their right was violated because multiple
continuances delayed the trial beyond the seventy-day period
167

Id.
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
618 F.3d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 2010).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 625.
175
Id. at 624.
176
Id. at 625.
168
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prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 177 The Seventh Circuit determined
that the proper level of review was for abuse of discretion and that a
showing of actual prejudice was required.178 In reviewing the district
court’s analysis, the Seventh Circuit examined the excludable days
exception and stated that “no showing of actual delay in trial is
required.” 179 The court stated that it would follow its established
precedent, which allowed certain classifications of delay, such as
pretrial motions, to be automatically excludable. 180 The Seventh
Circuit determined that the district court’s automatic exclusion, based
on ends-of-justice grounds, was proper in this case. 181
In addition, the Seventh Circuit stated that when a court excludes
time based on ends-of-justice grounds, it must explain its
reasoning. 182 The Seventh Circuit noted that congestion of a court’s
trial calendar is not a reason for exclusion on ends-of-justice
grounds. 183 The court established the following as factors to analyze
when determining whether exclusion based on ends-of-justice grounds
is proper:
[W]hether failure to grant a continuance would result in a
miscarriage of justice, whether the case is so complex that
adequate trial preparation is impossible under the Speedy
Trial Act’s time limits, and whether the failure to continue
would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel,
or would deny counsel the time necessary for effective
preparation. 184

177

See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
Hills, 618 F.3d at 626.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 626–27.
181
Id. (allowing automatic exclusion for pre-trial motions, continuances, and
on ends-of-justice grounds).
182
Id. at 628–29.
183
Id.
184
Id. (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C) (2006)).
178
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The Seventh Circuit examined the district court’s reasoning for
granting the continuance, which included the complexity of the case
and the fact that the defendants would not be greatly prejudiced by a
delay since they were not in custody. 185 The Seventh Circuit
determined that the district court’s reasoning was sufficient to meet the
requirements of § 3161 of the Act. 186 As a result, the time was
properly excluded and the court determined that the defendants’
Speedy Trial Act claim failed. 187
The defendants also argued that they had a personal right to a
speedy trial and that Tylman’s counsel could not override their
decision to exercise that right by filing a motion for a
continuance. 188 The court stated that this argument was without merit
because “trial tactics have always been within counsel’s province.” 189
Counsel does not have to obtain a defendant’s consent prior to making
a tactical decision, such as the decision to seek a continuance. 190
The Seventh Circuit also considered the defendants’ constitutional
right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. 191 The court stated
that it would review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. 192
The factors analyzed to determine a Sixth Amendment speedy
trial violation include “whether delay before trial was uncommonly
long[,] whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to
blame for that delay[,] whether, in due course, the defendant asserted
his right to a speedy trial[,] and whether he suffered prejudice as the
delay’s result.” 193 The court also stated that a delay of one year is

185

Id. at 628–29.
Id.
187
Id. at 629–30.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 626–28.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
186
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presumptively prejudicial. 194 While the Speedy Trial Act requires
defendants to be tried within seventy days, 195 this is not a requirement
in the constitutional analysis. Instead, the constitutional analysis
focuses more on a presumption of prejudice and if the time that passed
was reasonable. 196 The court determined that there was a presumption
of prejudice in this case because there was a two-year delay. 197
However, the court determined that the delay was mostly
attributable to the defendants for the following reasons: the
continuance was to allow counsel more time to prepare, the delay
occurred because of the defendants’ difficulty securing counsel, and
the defendants caused a delay when they incorrectly believed the
government was withholding information. 198 The court also
determined that the defendants failed to show that they suffered any
prejudice by the delay. 199 A defendant must demonstrate prejudice
with specificity, and in this case, the defendants did not show that their
defenses were prejudiced. 200 In addition, the defendants did not show
evidence of anxiety or that they were subjected to pretrial
incarceration. 201 As a result, the defendants’ constitutional right to a
speedy trial was not violated. 202

194

Id. at 629–30.
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006).
196
Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–28.
197
Id. at 629–30 (where there was a presumption of prejudice because the trial
occurred two years after the indictment).
198
Id. at 630–32.
199
Id. at 632–33.
200
Id. at 632 (only two witnesses stated that passage of time affected their
memories).
201
Id. at 632–33.
202
Id.
195
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5. United States v. Sykes
In United States v. Sykes, the defendant was convicted on four
counts of bank robbery in the district court. 203 Sykes then filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial
Act. 204 The district court dismissed the charges without prejudice and
ordered Sykes released. 205 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision. 206
The same day that the district court dismissed the charges without
prejudice, a grand jury indicted Skyes for the same four bank
robberies. 207 Sykes disrupted the proceedings, and the judge entered a
plea of not guilty on his behalf. 208 Four days before the trial, Sykes
moved to dismiss the charges based on his right to a speedy trial (and
his Fifth Amendment right to meaningful access to the courts). 209
The Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he Speedy Trial Act generally
requires a federal criminal trial to begin within seventy days from the
date the defendant is charged or makes his initial appearance.” 210
However, there are some exclusions to the seventy-day rule that can be
found in § 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act. 211 These exclusions allow
time to be automatically excluded when determining if the time limit
provided by the Act has been violated. 212 “After [seventy]
nonexcludable days have passed, the Act requires the district court to

203

614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 307.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 305–06.
207
Id. at 307.
208
Id. (“[H]e again made some bizarre arguments and otherwise disrupted the
proceedings. The judge held him in contempt and entered not guilty pleas on his
behalf.”).
209
Id.
210
Id. at 309–10 (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2006)).
211
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006); Sykes, 614 F.3d at 309–10.
212
Sykes, 614 F.3d at 309–10.
204
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dismiss the charges ‘on motion of the defendant.’” 213 In this case,
Sykes made such a motion, and the district court dismissed the
charges. 214
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for
abuse of discretion, “but under[took] more substantive scrutiny to
ensure that the judgment [was] supported in terms of the factors
identified in the statute.” 215 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district
court’s explanation and analysis of the facts and determined that there
was not an abuse of discretion. 216 The district court correctly
concluded that the bank robbery charges were “quite serious” and that
“a dismissal with prejudice would result in ‘a gross miscarriage of
justice’ given the gravity of the offenses.” 217 The district court stated,
and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that the delay was “‘unconscious’ on
the part of the government and the court” and instead was a result of
the actions of Sykes. 218 Sykes also waited to claim the Speedy Trial
Act violation until his motion to dismiss. 219 In addition, the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the district court’s statement that any claim of
prejudice would be weak because Sykes was “‘largely responsible’ for
most of the continuances.” 220 The Seventh Circuit stated that because
“Sykes did not bring the delay to the court’s attention as the number of
nonexcludable days accumulated,” it could justify dismissal without
prejudice. 221 The court noted that “a defendant who waits passively
while the time runs has less claim to dismissal with prejudice than
does a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt

213

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)).
Id.
215
Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1988)).
216
Id. at 310.
217
Id. at 309–10.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 310.
214
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attention.” 222 However, there is not a “presumption in favor of
dismissal without prejudice for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.” 223
The Seventh Circuit also focused on the fact that Sykes had
repeatedly made frivolous arguments. 224 The court stated that while
the delay was lengthy (224 nonexcludable days), it was only one factor
to consider. 225 A delay of that length does not require dismissal
without prejudice on its own. 226 As a result, the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the district court’s analysis of the case and affirmed its decision to
dismiss without prejudice. 227
II. A COMPARISON OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH WITH THE
APPROACH OF OTHER CIRCUITS AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Seventh Circuit’s approach when analyzing a defendant’s
constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial is generally
consistent with the approach of other circuits and the Supreme Court.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of a court’s discretion to
dismiss with or without prejudice has been in line with that of the
other courts.
A. The Constitutional Right
The Supreme Court in Barker analyzed four major factors in
determining if the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had
been violated. 228 It looked at (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason
for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right, and (4)
222

Id. (citing United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988))
(showing a consistent consideration of a defendant’s assertion of his right in the
Seventh Circuit).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 311–12.
228
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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whether the defendant suffered prejudice. 229 The Supreme Court also
noted the detrimental effect that imprisonment could have on the
defendant and the possibility that the defendant would use delay as a
tactic. 230
The Seventh Circuit in Hills evaluated all of the factors laid out in
Barker. 231 In addition to those factors, the court stated that a delay of
one year was presumptively prejudicial. 232 The court put emphasis on
who was at fault for the delay and the need for the defendant to
demonstrate prejudice with specificity. 233
B. The Statutory Right
The Speedy Trial Act lists multiple periods of delay that are
excluded when computing the time within which the trial must
commence. 234 These periods of delay are often automatically
excludable and include pre-trial motions, continuances, and exclusions
based on ends-of-justice grounds. 235 The Fifth Circuit in GonzalezRodriguez and the Eighth Circuit in Orozco-Osbaldo held that pretrial
motions are automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(D) of the
Act. 236 According to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, a violation of the
Speedy Trial Act does not occur as long as there is prompt disposition
of the pretrial motion. 237

229

Id.
Id. at 520–21.
231
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 2010).
232
Id. at 629–30.
233
Id. at 632.
234
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)–(8) (2006).
235
Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–27.
236
United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 369 (5th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d 955, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2010).
237
Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 369; Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d at 956–
57.
230
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The Supreme Court in Taylor adopted the same factors used for
the constitutional analysis that were provided in Barker. 238 While the
Seventh Circuit in Hills considered one common factor with Taylor—
whether the defendant suffered prejudice—its view fell more in line
with that of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
The Seventh Circuit in Hills focused on a need to show actual
prejudice, but stated that there was no need to show actual delay. 239
The court also noted some situations where time was automatically
excludable. 240 The Seventh Circuit then established factors to
determine whether it was proper to exclude days based on ends-ofjustice grounds. 241 These factors led to the exclusion of additional
situations, including where (1) there would be a miscarriage of justice,
(2) the complexity of the case required it, and (3) the case required
more time (for example, to allow for discovery or to appoint
counsel). 242 However, the court left these exclusions open to
interpretation by simply stating that a court must explain its reasoning
when excluding time based on ends-of-justice grounds. 243
C. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
The Speedy Trial Act provides the following factors for courts to
consider when deciding to dismiss with or without prejudice: “the
seriousness of the offense[,] the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal[,] and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice.” 244
However, instead of relying solely on the factors required by the Act,
the courts have developed their own version of factors to analyze.

238

United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988).
Hills, 618 F.3d at 626.
240
Id. at 626–27 (e.g., pretrial motions).
241
Id. at 628–29 (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C) (2006)).
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
239
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The Supreme Court in Taylor focused on the seriousness of the
crime, the lackadaisical conduct of the government, and the
defendant’s failure to appear for trial when determining whether to
dismiss with or without prejudice. 245 The Court also required a finding
of prejudice to even consider dismissal with prejudice because
reprosecution is favored if there is no finding of prejudice. 246
Like the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit in Killingsworth
focused on the seriousness of the crime, whether the defendant
suffered prejudice, if a detriment to the defendant occurred, and if the
delay was intentional. 247 The Seventh Circuit in Arango focused on
similar factors, but also considered who was at fault for the delay to be
an important factor. 248 The Seventh Circuit in Fountain took its own
approach and focused primarily on whether the government was
careless, if the defendant had asserted his right, and if the defendant
suffered any detriment. 249
The Seventh Circuit further expanded on these factors in Sykes.
The court in Sykes focused on the seriousness of the crime, the facts
and circumstances of the case, whether the defendant suffered
prejudice, whether the delay was a conscious effort on the part of the
defendant or the government, whether the defendant asserted his right,
and the length of the delay. 250 This approach seems to mesh together
the approach required by the Speedy Trial Act with that of the
Supreme Court and previous cases in the Seventh Circuit. However,
none of the cases discussed in this Note considered the impact of
reprosecution, 251 as is required by the Speedy Trial Act. 252
245

United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988).
Id. at 341.
247
United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (7th Cir. 2007).
248
United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
since the delay was the fault of the court, there could be no deterrent effect from
punishing the prosecution that was not at fault).
249
United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 512–13 (7th Cir. 1988).
250
United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2010).
251
See supra Parts I.C, I.D, I.E.
252
See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006).
246
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III. THE REALITY OF THE RIGHT’S APPLICATION
The Seventh Circuit focuses on the same factors as the Supreme
Court when determining whether a violation of one’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial occurred. 253 However, the Seventh Circuit
ignores the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Taylor 254 when it
determines if a violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred. 255 Instead,
the Seventh Circuit focuses on the excludable days exception. 256 The
Seventh Circuit seems to espouse the idea that considering multiple
factors can help to protect a defendant’s rights more thoroughly. Its
application of these factors to determine a constitutional and a
statutory violation is usually thorough.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit’s approach in determining
whether to dismiss with or without prejudice began as almost identical
to the Supreme Court’s approach and has expanded with time. 257 The
Seventh Circuit has expanded on the factors laid out in the Speedy
Trial Act, especially “the facts and circumstances of the case which led
to the dismissal.” 258 The Supreme Court 259 and earlier Seventh
Circuit 260 decisions focused on the seriousness of the crime, whether
the defendant was prejudiced, and if the delay was intentional (or a
result of laziness by the prosecution). 261 However, the Seventh Circuit
253

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d
619, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010).
254
See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338–40 (1988).
255
See Hills, 618 F.3d at 623–24.
256
Id. at 626–29.
257
See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
Hills, 618 F.3d at 623–24; United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087 (7th Cir.
2007); United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
258
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006).
259
See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 326.
260
See Hills, 618 F.3d at 619; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879
F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509.
261
See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 338–41; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1090–91;
Arango, 879 F.2d at 1508.
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expanded this approach in Sykes by also examining the facts and
circumstances of the case, who was at fault for the delay, and the
length of the delay. 262 These additional factors provide more insight,
but lean heavily toward dismissal without prejudice. With regard to
determining whether to dismiss with or without prejudice, the Seventh
Circuit may have the more thorough approach (as compared to the
Supreme Court and other circuits).
IV. IS THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL PROTECTED IN PRACTICE?
While the Seventh Circuit is thorough in its analysis and
application of multiple factors to determine if a violation of the right to
a speedy trial has occurred, it may not always come to the correct
conclusion. The Seventh Circuit is consistent in its analysis of all of
the necessary factors used to determine if a violation has occurred;
however, it applies these factors very liberally. 263 The court seems to
imply that a grave violation would have to occur for the defendant to
receive a meaningful remedy. 264 The court has done this by liberally
applying the excludable days exception in § 3162 of the Speedy Trial
Act. 265 This has been done to the point where it encompasses almost
every delay caused by either party. 266
The Seventh Circuit in Hills “concluded that Congress intended
certain classifications of delay to be excludable automatically.” 267 This
automatic exclusion includes time needed to decide pretrial motions,
the granting of continuances, and exclusions based on ends-of-justice
grounds. 268 As a result, the Seventh Circuit has failed to analyze the
262

United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32;
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at
509.
264
See generally Sykes, 614 F.3d at 305–06; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087;
Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509.
265
See id.
266
See id.
267
Hills, 618 F.3d at 626.
268
Id.
263
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necessity or reasonableness of each exclusion. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit has simply automatically excluded the classifications of delay
provided in the Speedy Trial Act and has left the exclusions on endsof-justice grounds open for interpretation. 269 This has made it difficult
for the defendant to claim a violation because most classifications of
delay are easily excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.
This approach by the Seventh Circuit does not promote the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment, which was “(1) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration[,] (2) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility that defense
will be impaired.” 270 The purpose of the right is frustrated when
lengthy delays are disguised under excludable exceptions. In addition,
the Seventh Circuit has completely ignored one purpose of the Sixth
Amendment—prevention of oppressive pre-trial incarceration. 271 The
Seventh Circuit consistently has been only concerned with delay being
used as a tactic by the defendant, and it has consciously ignored
lengthy pre-trial incarceration. 272 This is a result of the exclusions of
the Speedy Trial Act not being applied to meet the purposes of the
Sixth Amendment.
Even if the days are not excludable, the defendant’s right is often
not protected. In cases where the court admits that a violation of the
right to a speedy trial has occurred, it often decides that the defendant
still did not suffer prejudice. 273 The court requires the level of
prejudice to be extremely high before it will consider the violation to
be prejudicial.
This means that even if the Seventh Circuit determines that a
violation that warrants dismissal did occur, the defendant is still on an
269

See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A)–(H) (2006) (listing the
excludable days); Hills, 618 F.3d at 626.
270
Hills, 618 F.3d at 631–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
271
See id.
272
See id. at 628–29, 632–33; United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087,
1091 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that incarceration is not a focus).
273
See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1501 (7th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 509 (7th Cir. 1988)
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uphill climb. Without a finding of prejudice to the defense, the court is
unlikely to dismiss with prejudice. 274 The Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly dismissed these types of claims without prejudice, even
when the delays have been lengthy and at the fault of the
prosecution. 275 When the court dismisses without prejudice, the
defendant does not receive a meaningful remedy. While some cases,
and even the Speedy Trial Act, consider dismissal without prejudice a
sanction, 276 it is unlikely that a defendant would consider this a
meaningful remedy. The defendant will often be reprosecuted and in
the end has only delayed the inevitable. 277 This does not provide a
remedy or a proper sanction for the violation.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, along with the Supreme Court
and other circuits, seem to gloss over who is to blame for the delay, 278
making this factor less important than it was meant to be. It makes
sense to hold the defendant accountable for any delays he caused;
however, other delays not caused by the defendant should be

274

See Hills, 618 F.3d at 628–33; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1090; Arango,
879 F.2d at 1508.
275
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13.
276
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1091
(considering dismissal without prejudice as a sanction); United States v. Lauderdale,
No. 06-cr-30142-MJR, 2007 WL 1100617, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (stating
that “dismissal without prejudice is ‘not a completely negligible sanction, viewed
from a deterrent standpoint, since the grand jury may refuse to reindict and since
even if it does the defendant may be acquitted.’”).
277
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13.
278
See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 328, 343 (1988) (where slow
processing by the court and government occurred and there was a lackadaisical
attitude on the part of the government); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 516–17
(1972) (where there were more than sixteen continuances granted); United States v.
Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d 955, 957–58 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing all days needed to
decide pre-trial motions to be excluded); United States v. Boyd, 392 F. App’x 595,
597 (9th Cir. 2010) (allowing delay because it was caused in good faith by the state);
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1089–90 (stating that it is impossible to determine if the
court or government was at fault for the delay and that the delay was unintentional);
Fountain, 840 F.2d at 513 (expressing distaste at how the case proceeded because of
the prosecution’s neglect of the case).
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attributable to the prosecution. 279 It should not matter if the court or
the prosecutor was responsible for the unreasonable delay. 280 No
matter which is at fault (as long as it is not the defendant), the
defendant’s right has been unjustly violated. If the defendant is not
responsible for the delay, it makes sense to hold the prosecution liable
for that delay and to recognize a violation of the defendant’s right. The
defendant deserves an adequate remedy when he has suffered a loss of
his rights, and the prosecution should be deterred from allowing any
future violations.
In addition, the fact that the delay was unintentional should not be
considered. 281 The notion that the prosecution did not intentionally
violate the defendant’s rights should have no bearing on the court’s
decision. It matters that the defendant’s rights were violated, not that
the prosecution did not intentionally let it happen. Laziness on the part
of the prosecution should favor the defendant and lean toward a
finding that a violation of the defendant’s rights occurred. 282
While the Seventh Circuit often claims policy reasons for its
approach of dismissing without prejudice, 283 the policy reasons behind
the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment do not support the court’s
approach. It is true that one of the Seventh Circuit’s policy
considerations is to protect the public and to prevent the impairment of
the deterrent effect of punishment, 284 but other policy considerations
279

See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30 (stating that it is proper to put the burden of
ensuring a speedy trial on the prosecution).
280
See United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1508 (7th Cir. 1989) (where
the court unreasonably differentiated between the court and prosecution being at
fault).
281
See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; Arango, 879 F.2d at 1501; Fountain, 840 F.2d at
509.
282
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512–13 (“We therefore inquire not whether the
prosecution was careless (it was), but whether the district judge made a reasoned
decision in light of the statutory criteria.” Even though the prosecution was careless,
“the district court was entitled to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.”).
283
Anne E. Melley, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Speedy
Trial Act, 46 A.L.R. FED. 2D 129 § 3 (2010).
284
Id.
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deal with the denial of the defendant’s liberty. 285 Another function of
the Speedy Trial Act is to hold the prosecution accountable for its
actions and to ensure that the government does not ignore a case or
leave a defendant in prison awaiting trial for an unreasonable amount
of time. 286 None of these policy reasons are met when the defendant is
not tried in an expeditious manner or when the defendant is not
provided a remedy. The prosecution receives no punishment for
violating the defendant’s rights if it can simply bring the case against
the defendant again. 287 Justice is not served, and the defendant loses
his liberty. It is important for the court to balance the threat that the
defendant poses to society against a protection of the defendant’s
rights. The Seventh Circuit has not struck this balance because it
seems to require an extraordinary violation to even consider dismissal
with prejudice. 288
The Seventh Circuit has stated additional public policy reasons for
why it rarely dismisses with prejudice, such as the theory that it is
better to deny a criminal his rights than to let him walk free. 289 While
it may be true that society would be safer and that many citizens
would probably prefer that the defendant not walk free, the court has
missed the point. While public policy should, and does, shape our laws
and the way they are applied, our Founding Fathers established certain

285

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972); see United States v. Hills, 618
F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing the
purposes of the Sixth Amendment: “(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration[,]
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused[,] and (3) to limit the possibility
that defense will be impaired.”).
286
See id.
287
See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006) (including dismissal
with or without prejudice as a sanction); United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d
1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Courts view dismissal without prejudice as a
sanction.”).
288
See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2010);
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
289
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 512.
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rights that were considered fundamental 290 and were to be left
untouched and unlimited. This means that the Speedy Trial Act should
be interpreted in a way that promotes the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment.
With the way that the Seventh Circuit currently applies the
Speedy Trial Act, the defendant can actually benefit from not asserting
his right to a speedy trial. 291 The defendant may actually end up being
detained longer by asserting his right because if the court determines
that no violation occurred, the defendant would have been detained the
entire time that the court is making that decision. In addition, after the
court determines that a violation did not occur, the trial continues.
Even if the court determines that the defendant’s rights were violated,
it can end up making the process longer and more strenuous for the
defendant because he is often subject to reprosecution. 292 This was not
the intent of the Speedy Trial Act or the Sixth Amendment; 293 as a
result, a better process must emerge.
V. CHANGE IS REQUIRED
The defects discussed above have created negative effects on the
rights of defendants in the Seventh Circuit. There are some technical
issues with the court’s approach, as well as some possibly unintended
consequences.
One technical issue is the lack of a well thought out standard in
the Seventh Circuit with regard to the use of the excludable days
exception. The courts’ ability to exclude days based on ends-of-justice
grounds 294 could result in unintended consequences. The court can
exclude days if it can show that the reasons for granting the
290

Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30 (stating that the right to a speedy trial is a
fundamental right).
291
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 511.
292
See id. (where the trial was longer—delayed 209 days—because the
defendant asserted that a violation occurred).
293
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010).
294
See id. at 628–29.
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continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant. 295 This exclusion is open-ended and gives the court the
opportunity to expand it far beyond the intent of the legislature. Since
the right to a speedy trial is protected by the Constitution 296 and the
Speedy Trial Act, 297 it is one that is considered important and
fundamental. 298 This would seem to imply that other interests should
almost never outweigh the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. In
addition, the public has an interest in a guilty defendant being tried
and sentenced quickly and efficiently. 299 While there may be occasions
when one party needs more time for discovery or preparation,300 this
should not be looked at lightly. The parties should be required to
adhere to the deadlines imposed by the court. Excluding days on endsof-justice grounds should only be used in limited circumstances that
should be better outlined by Congress in the Speedy Trial Act.
Another possible unintended consequence results from an
attorney’s ability to make a tactical decision. 301 The defendant’s
attorney has the authority to make decisions regarding the progression
of the case. 302 While the defendant has the right to decide to testify, to
plead guilty or not guilty, and to settle, the defendant’s attorney has the
right to make decisions regarding which motions to file. 303 In effect,
this means that the defense attorney could unnecessarily delay the
case. If the defendant tried to claim a violation, he would likely fail
because the court would attribute the delay to the defendant. 304 This is
295

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
297
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
298
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972).
299
Melley, supra note 283, at § 3 (“to serve the public interest by . . . reducing
a defendant’s opportunity to commit crimes while on pretrial release.”).
300
See Hills, 618 F.3d at 626–30 (tactical decisions, including continuances,
are within counsel’s discretion).
301
See id. at 626–28.
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).
296
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because any action of the defendant’s counsel is attributed to the
defendant. 305 As a result, as long as the defense counsel can justify his
decision as reasonable, he could unnecessarily delay the case, and the
defendant would not be afforded a remedy.
Lastly, delay seems to be the only result of a recognized violation
of the right to a speedy trial. In one case, the court noted that the
defendant’s trial was lengthened by the assertion of his right to a
speedy trial. 306 A defendant’s assertion of a violation of his rights
should not lengthen or further delay the process. However, because the
courts almost always dismiss without prejudice, 307 the case is simply
brought again. This means that the only effect of the defendant’s
assertion of his right is to delay his conviction or acquittal. It may be
better for the defendant to just accept the violation of his right and
allow the trial to continue, instead of start all over again. 308 A better
remedy should be provided if this is going to be the continued
approach. Otherwise, the only remedy is for the court to recognize the
violation of the defendant’s right and for the defendant to be charged
again. 309 When this occurs, the defendant does not gain anything from
asserting his right.

305

See id.
United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988).
307
See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Arango, 879
F.2d 1501, 1509 (7th Cir. 1989); Fountain, 840 F.2d at 509, 513.
308
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 511 (more time passed before trial than if the
defendant had not asserted his right to a speedy trial).
309
See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2006) (including dismissal
with or without prejudice as a sanction); Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 1091 (“Courts
view dismissal without prejudice as a sanction.”).
306
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VI. A NEW APPROACH TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
With all the faults of the Seventh Circuit’s current approach to the
Speedy Trial Act, a new bright-line rule must be established. While it
is very difficult to establish the exact circumstances in which a
violation occurs or in which a case should be dismissed with prejudice,
a better standard than the one currently in place must emerge. One’s
right to a speedy trial is protected by the Constitution, 310 and this in
and of itself shows the importance of the right to each individual.
In addition, besides protecting the defendant, the Speedy Trial Act
also helps protect the public. 311 One way in which the Act helps
protect the public is by ensuring that the defendant is tried in an
expeditious manner. 312 The public interest is best served when the
defendant is brought to justice in a timely and efficient manner. 313 The
defendant benefits because his constitutional and statutory right is
protected and he does not have to endure unnecessary pre-trial
incarceration. As a result, it is important to both the public and the
defendant that a better way to assess the right to a speedy trial is
developed.
One necessary step is to stop lengthy delays that are not the fault
of the defendant. 314 Even if the defendant’s case is not prejudiced (for
example, by a witness’s loss of memory or similar situations), the
defendant has still suffered harm. The defendant has a right to a
speedy trial, 315 and if the court does not enforce that right, he has
suffered prejudice because his fundamental right has been limited. 316
310

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Melley, supra note 283, at § 3.
312
Id.
313
Id. (“to serve the public interest by . . . reducing a defendant’s opportunity
to commit crimes while on pretrial release.”).
314
This should partly be accomplished by limiting the excludable days
exception. See supra Parts IV & V.
315
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162
(2006).
316
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30
(1972).
311
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The Seventh Circuit in Hills stated that “delays approaching one year
[are] presumptively prejudicial”; 317 however, the court has not applied
that presumption in its recent cases. The court should enforce the oneyear threshold when determining if the defendant has been prejudiced.
Any delay that is not attributable to the defendant and that is one year
or longer would automatically show that the defendant has suffered
prejudice. This finding of prejudice should then be considered with
regard to choosing to dismiss with or without prejudice.
It is also important for the court to strike a balance between
dismissing with and without prejudice. If a court recognizes that a
defendant’s rights have been violated, the defendant still has no
meaningful remedy unless the court chooses to dismiss with prejudice.
If the court dismisses without prejudice, the defendant could be
retried, and the offending party receives no punishment for its
violation. 318 While dismissal with prejudice should not be used
liberally, it should at least be considered.
One solution is to afford the defendant a remedy through a civil
319
suit. If the defendant’s rights have been violated, he could take
action by suing the party that caused the delay. This would give the
defendant an opportunity to get monetary compensation for the
violation. However, this remedy would only compensate one group
that the Speedy Trial Act was meant to protect. The Speedy Trial Act
was enacted to protect the defendant, as well as to protect the public
interest. 320 A civil suit would compensate the defendant for a
deprivation of his rights; however, it would not compensate the public
for a violation of its rights. The public has an interest in quickly trying

317

United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2010).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (including dismissal with or without prejudice
as a sanction); United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Courts view dismissal without prejudice as a sanction.”); United States v.
Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988) (where the defendant was indicted
again).
319
Possibly a civil suit grounded in negligence or a malpractice action against
counsel.
320
Melley, supra note 283, at § 3.
318
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and sentencing guilty defendants, 321 and this remedy does not address
that interest. In addition, this solution does not deter future violations
because the individuals at fault are not likely to be held responsible.
The larger entity that employs the individual would probably pay for
any damages awarded. 322 In order for monetary compensation to be an
effective remedy and deter future violations, the individual at fault
must be held responsible, and the interests of the defendant and of the
public must be addressed. Since the proper party is not likely to be
held responsible and the remedy does not benefit both parties suffering
from the violation, a different approach may better serve the ends of
justice.
The best solution may be to sanction the individual responsible
for each violation. 323 There is a long-standing sentiment to put the
burden of ensuring a speedy trial on the prosecutors. 324 It is practical
to put the responsibility on the lawyers because they are in the best
position to expedite the case by filing fewer motions and by speaking
to the judge. If a lawyer were held responsible for his failure to abide
by constitutional and statutory law, it may provide an incentive for him
to efficiently expedite the process.
The Speedy Trial Act allows sanctions to be imposed on lawyers
for conscious delay of trial. 325 The Act allows the court to sanction the
attorney at fault for the delay by reducing the amount of compensation
paid to the attorney, imposing a fine, denying the attorney the right to
practice before the court for a period of time, or filing a report with a
321

See id. (interest stems from a need to reduce a “defendant’s opportunity to
commit crimes while on pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial delay from
impairing the deterrent effect of punishment.”)
322
If the employee was acting within the course of employment, the employer
would be liable under the theory of respondeat superior.
323
See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (2006) (listing sanctions for counsel).
324
United States v. Lauderdale, No. 06-cr-30142-MJR, 2007 WL 1100617, at
*4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (“This rule reflects the long-held sentiment that the
ultimate responsibility to ensure the prosecution of individuals is done legally and in
a way that does not violate their rights should rest on the shoulders of those doing
the prosecuting.”).
325
18 U.S.C. § 3162(b).
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disciplinary committee. 326 However, the Seventh Circuit has only
discussed dismissal with or without prejudice as a sanction 327 and has
not discussed sanctioning a lawyer under § 3162(b). 328 In Fountain,
the court readily admitted that the lawyers were lackadaisical and at
fault; however, it did not sanction those individuals. 329 If the case was
handled poorly enough for the court to mention it in its opinion, 330
sanctions may be warranted. If the lawyer handled the case poorly
once, he may handle it poorly again.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Carlone stated that
“[c]ourts . . . have broad and flexible powers to prevent the abuse of
their processes.” 331 The Seventh Circuit stated that “[a]lternative
sanctions are available that do not involve . . . windfalls for law
breakers.” 332 The court stated that these alternatives included revoking
or shortening continuances (only prospectively) or refusing to grant
future continuances. 333 The Seventh Circuit should continue to build
on these alternative sanctions with the sanctions provided in § 3162(b)
of the Speedy Trial Act.

326

Id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(A)–(E).
See United States v. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2007)
(considering dismissal without prejudice as a sanction); Lauderdale, 2007 WL
1100617, at *5 (“dismissal without prejudice is ‘not a completely negligible
sanction, viewed from a deterrent standpoint, since the grand jury may refuse to
reindict and since even if it does the defendant may be acquitted.’”).
328
See generally United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2010);
Killingsworth, 507 F.3d 1087; United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
329
See Fountain, 840 F.2d at 513.
330
See id.
331
666 F.2d 1112, 1115–16 (7th Cir. 1981).
332
Id. (referring to the fact that dismissal with prejudice punishes “not only the
prosecutor but the entire law-abiding public” because it forever precludes the
government from trying defendants that have been accused of serious crimes).
333
Id.
327
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If the court held the responsible party liable, as the statute
provides for, 334 it may help to protect the defendant’s rights. A
violation is less likely if counsel knows that he could be required to
pay a fine or be prohibited from practicing for a period of time. 335 If
the individuals are sanctioned, the defendant may feel like his right has
been recognized and that the person responsible for the deprivation of
that right has been held accountable. Sanctioning the lawyer who is at
fault for the delay would also hold him responsible to the public for
failure to try the defendant in an efficient and expedient manner.
Sanctions would act as a deterrent in future cases because violators
would know that there were consequences to their actions. In addition,
sanctions are an attractive option because they do not prevent
criminals from being punished “as a by-product of trying to prevent
misconduct by government officers.” 336 As a result, the public is still
protected because sanctions allow the criminal to still be punished.
Sanctions could also deter the unnecessary expansion of the
excludable days exception. If these exceptions are applied more
conservatively, attorneys will not be able to hide under its expansive
umbrella. Attorneys would not be able to designate as many forms of
delay as excludable, which would cause them to be more cautious in
the case proceedings. This would help to expedite the case because
attorneys would not unnecessarily delay the trial for fear of sanctions.
In addition, there would be less concern for abuse of tactical
decisions made by attorneys. Attorneys are allowed to make tactical
decisions without approval of their clients; 337 this includes requesting
continuances. 338 If sanctions can be awarded for unnecessary delay,
attorneys would be less likely to abuse their authority to make these
decisions. Sanctions would deter a defense attorney from requesting
unnecessary continuances.
334

Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (2006).
Id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(B)–(D) (providing for fines and denial of the right to
practice).
336
Carlone, 666 F.2d at 1115–16.
337
United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 626–28 (7th Cir. 2010).
338
Id.
335
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There would also be less concern about the ability to reprosecute
the defendant if the trial were conducted according to the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. Sanctions could
help deter delays, which would result in quicker trials and less
violations.
Allowing the court to administer sanctions may be the most
appropriate and efficient approach because the Speedy Trial Act
already allows courts to do so. 339 The court is well-versed in how and
why the delay occurred, and therefore, it may be able to impose
sanctions more quickly. In addition, the court will likely know who is
truly at fault for the delay; therefore, it will be easier for it to provide
justice to the victim of the violation.
More defined guidelines for imposing these sanctions must be
defined in the Speedy Trial Act. 340 The Act currently allows sanctions
In any case in which counsel for the defendant or the attorney
for the Government (1) knowingly allows the case to be set
for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial; (2) files a motion solely for the
purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and
without merit; (3) makes a statement for the purpose of
obtaining a continuance which he knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or (4)
otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without
justification consistent with section 3161 . . . 341
This seems to allow sanctions only when counsel has intentionally,
knowingly, or willfully delayed the trial. 342 This unnecessarily limits
the applicability of the sanctions provided by the Speedy Trial Act.
339

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(b)(4)(E)–(c) (“The authority to punish provided for
by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to
such court.”).
340
See id. §§ 3162(b)(4)(A)–(E) (listing the current sanctions).
341
Id. § 3162(b).
342
See id.
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There may be situations where counsel is lackadaisical in his duties, 343
and while he does not intend to delay the trial, that is the direct result
of his actions. In that situation, counsel is just as much at fault for the
delay as if he willfully caused the delay. The Speedy Trial Act should
expand its scope 344 to allow sanctions for attorneys who unnecessarily
neglect the case, both intentionally and unintentionally. This would
provide a greater deterrent from violations and would hold counsel
accountable for his duties.
The drawback of this remedy lies in what would occur if the court
were at fault for the delay. It is unlikely that a judge will sanction
himself; however, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges may
provide for disciplinary action. 345 The Code states that “[a] judge
should dispose promptly of the business of the court.” 346 This puts an
obligation on the court to ensure that trials are conducted in an
expeditious manner. In addition, the Code requires judges with
supervisory authority to ensure that those under their control perform
their duties “timely and effectively.” 347 As a result, judges have an
affirmative duty to ensure that the case is promptly decided, and
supervisory judges have a duty to discipline judges that do not fulfill
this duty. 348 While the burden to ensure a speedy trial should still be
placed on the prosecution, the Code provides a backup to ensure that
the responsible party is punished.
343

See United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating
that the prosecution neglected the case).
344
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(b)(4)(E)–(c) (“The authority to punish provided for
by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to
such court.”).
345
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, vol. 2, ch. 2, at canon 3,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf.
346
Id. at canon 3(A)(5) (with commentary stating that judges are to reduce
avoidable delays and ensure that lawyers cooperate).
347
Id. at canon 3(B)(4) (“A judge with supervisory authority over other judges
should take reasonable measures to ensure that they perform their duties timely and
effectively.”).
348
Id. at canons 3(A)(5), 3(B)(4).
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There is no perfect remedy for the defendant; however, it is
important for the court to find a balance between the defendant’s rights
and the interests of the public. It is important for the court to protect
society by ensuring that criminals end up in prison; however, this
cannot be done without regard to the defendant’s constitutional and
statutory rights. The court must find a balance that best promotes the
imprisonment of criminals, as well as the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. 349 The Founders believed that
the right to a speedy trial was so essential that they included it in the
Constitution. 350 Congress then strengthened this right through the
Speedy Trial Act. 351 This means that the court should show deference
to the intentions of the Founders and of Congress. The court must do
its part to protect and balance the interests and the rights of the
defendant and the public. This balance is best met through the use of
sanctions, as explained above.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has a long uphill climb if it is going to find a
way to protect defendants’ rights the way that they were intended to be
protected by the Founding Fathers and Congress. While the Seventh
Circuit is not out of line with the approach taken by the Supreme
Court, that does not mean it is the best approach. The Seventh Circuit
needs to take the initiative and take the first step toward striking that
necessary balance between the interests of society and the rights of the
defendant. This is not likely to happen unless the Seventh Circuit
reduces the number of situations where excludable days are applicable
and cuts down on the ability to expand these exclusions. Sanctions on
the responsible individual provide the best remedy by deterring similar
conduct in the future and still allowing criminals to be punished. The
deterrent factor in turn protects the defendant by reducing the number
of violations and lengthy delays. The Seventh Circuit should focus on
349

See United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2010).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
351
See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
350
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effectively balancing the constitutional and statutory rights of
individuals and the public. The Seventh Circuit should take the
initiative and develop a new approach that establishes this balance
through the use of sanctions on individuals.
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